Inequality and envy by Cowell, Frank & Ebert, U
 
 
 
Inequality and Envy∗ 
 
Frank Cowell and Udo Ebert 
 
London School of Economics and Universität Oldenburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DARP 88      The Toyota Centre 
December 2006      Suntory and Toyota International  
       Centres for Economics and Related 
       Disciplines 
       London School of Economics 
       Houghton Street 
       London WC2A 2A 
 
     
       (+44 020) 7955 6674 
                                                 
∗ Correspondence to: F. A. Cowell, STICERD, LSE, Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE. 
(f.cowell@lse.ac.uk) and to: U. Ebert, University of Oldenburg, D26111 Oldenburg  
(ebert@uni-oldenburg.de). 
 
We would like to thank STICERD for hosting Ebert in order to facilitate our collaboration. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
Using a simple axiomatic structure we characterise two classes of  
inequality indices - absolute and relative - that take into account “envy” 
in the income distribution. The concept of envy incorporated here 
concerns the distance of each person’s income from his or her 
immediately richer neighbour. This is shown to be similar to justice 
concepts based on income relativities. 
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1 Introduction
There is considerable interest in a possible relationship between inequality and
envy. However there has been little attempt to incorporate the concept of
individual envy directly into the formal analysis of inequality measurement. Of
course there is a substantial economics literature that models envy in terms
of individual utility see for example Arnsperger (1994) but our focus here
is di¤erent in that we concentrate directly on incomes rather than on utility
and commodities. We seek an alternative way of characterising envy broadly
within the literature that has formalised related concepts such as deprivation
and individual complaints about income distribution. Indeed there is an aspect
of envy that can be considered as akin to the notion of a complaintthat has
been used as a basic building block of inequality analysis (Temkin 1993).1
A further motivation for our analytical approach can be found in the work
of social scientists who have sought to characterise issues of distributive justice
in terms of relative rewards. This is sometimes based on a model of individ-
ual utility that has as arguments not only ones own income, consumption or
performance, but also that of others in the community. A recent example of
this approach is the model in Falk and Knell (2004) where a persons utility
is increasing in his own income and decreasing in some reference income; Falk
and Knell (2004) raise the key question as to what constitutes reference income.
Should it be the same for all or relative to each persons income? Should it be
upward looking, as in the case of envy? Here we address these issues without
explicitly introducing individual utility. Our approach has a connection with
the seminal contribution of Merton (1957) who focuses on a proportionate re-
lationship between an individuals income and a reference income characterised
in terms of justice: we will show that there is a close relationship between some
of the inequality measures developed below and Mertons work.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the basic framework
within which we develop our analysis; section 3 characterises and examines the
properties of a class of absolute inequality measures; section 4 analyses the
corresponding class of relative indices.
2 The approach
We assume that the problem is one of evaluating and comparing income distrib-
utions in a nite xed-sized population of at least two members where individual
incomehas been dened as a real number, not necessarily positive. Through-
out the following we will work with vectors of ordered incomes.
1Our methodology is similar to that used in the analysis of poverty (Ebert and Moyes
2002), individual deprivation (Bossert and DAmbrosio 2006, Yitzhaki 1982) and complaint-
inequality (Cowell and Ebert 2004).
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2.1 Notation and denitions
Let D be the set of all logically possible values of income. For di¤erent parts of
the analysis we will need two di¤erent versions of this set, namely D = R and
D = R++. An income distribution is a vector
x := (x1; x2; :::; xn) 2 Dn
where the components are arranged in ascending order and n  2. So the space
of all possible income distributions is given by
X (D) := fx j x 2 Dn ; x1  x2  :::  xng :
Write 1k for the k-vector (1; 1; :::; 1) and let x(k; ) denote the vector x modied
by increasing the kth component by  and decreasing the component k + 1 by
:
x(k; ) := (x1; x2; :::; xk + ; xk+1   ; :::; xn)
where 1 < k < n and
0 <   1
2
[xk+1   xk] (1)
Denition 1 An inequality measure is a function J : X (D)! R+.
Denition 2 For any k such that 1 < k < n and any x 2 X (D) such that
xk < xk+1, a progressive transfer at position k is a transformation x 7! x(k; )
such that (1) is satised.
Note that denition 2 applies the concept of Dalton (1920) to transfers be-
tween neighbours. It should also be noted that we describe our envy-related
index everywhere as an inequality measure even where we do not insist on the
application of the principle of progressive transfers. As is common in the in-
equality literature we will deal with both absolute and relative approaches to
inequality measurement.
2.2 Basic axioms
Our main ethical principle is captured in the following two axioms.
Axiom 1 (Decomposability: nonoverlapping subgroups) For all x 2 X (D)
and 1  k  n  1:
J (x) = J (x1; :::; xk; xk1n k) + J (xk+11k; xk+1; :::; xn) + J (xk1k; xk+11n k)
(2)
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) For all x; y 2 D such that x  y and for all 1 
k  n  1 inequality J (x1k; y1n k) is increasing in y.
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Axiom 1 is fundamental in that it captures the aspect of the income dis-
tribution that matters in terms of envy at any position k. It might be seen
as analogous to a standard decomposition total inequality (on the left of 2)
equals the sum of inequality in the lower and upper subgroups dened by posi-
tion k (the rst two terms on the right of 2) and a between-group component
(last term on the right). However the analogy with conventional decomposition
by subgroups is not exact note for example that the rst two terms on the
right are not true subgroup-inequality expressions (which would have to have
population sizes k and n  k respectively) but are instead modied forms of the
whole distribution. Indeed, a better analogy is with the focus axiom in poverty
analysis: in the breakdown depicted in (2) we have rst the information in the
right-censored distribution then that in the left-censored distribution then the
information about pure envy at position k.
Axiom 2 has the interpretation that an increase in the pure envy component
in (2) must always increase inequality and that this increase is independent of
the rest of the income distribution.
To make progress we also need some assumptions that impose further struc-
ture on comparisons of income distributions. We will rst consider the following
two axioms:
Axiom 3 (Translatability) For all x 2 X (D) and " 2 R:
J (x+ "1n) = J (x)
Axiom 4 (Linear Homogeneity) For all x 2 X (D) and  2 R++:
J (x) = J (x)
Axioms 3 and 4 are standard in the literature; however, in section 4 we will
examine the possibility of replacing these with an alternative structure.
3 Absolute measures
We begin with results for the most general denition of the space of incomes.
Here incomes can have any value, positive, zero or negative; i.e. D = R. We
will rst characterise the class of measures that is implied by the parsimonious
axiomatic structure set out in section 2 and then we will examine this class
in the light of the conventional properties with which inequality measures are
conventionally endowed.
3.1 Characterisation
To start with let us note that the decomposability assumption implies that J
has a convenient property for a distribution displaying perfect equality:
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Proposition 1 Axiom 1 implies that, for all x 2 D:
J (x1n) = 0 (3)
Proof. For an arbitrary integer k such that 1  k  n  1 Axiom 1 implies
J (x1n) = 3J (x1k; x1n k) = 3J (x1n)
But this is only true if (3) holds.
We use this property in the proof of the main result, Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 2 Axioms 1 and 2 imply that,
1. for all x 2 X (D) such that not all components of x are equal:
J (x) > 0; (4)
2. for all x 2 X (D)
J (x) =
n 1X
i=1
Ki (xi; xi+1) ; (5)
where each Ki satises the property Ki (xi; xi+1) > 0 if xi+1 > xi.
Proof. Applying Axiom 1 in the case k = 1 we have
J (x) = J (x1; x11n 1) + J (x2; x2; x3; :::; xn) + J (x1; x21n 1) :
So, by Proposition 1, we have
J (x) = J (x2; x2; x3; :::; xn) + J (x1; x21n 1) (6)
Applying Axiom 1 again to the rst term in (6) we obtain
J (x) = [J (x3; x3; x3; x4; :::; xn) + J (x212; x31n 2)] + J (x1; x21n 1)
Repeated application of the same argument gives us
J (x) =
n 1X
i=1
J (xi1i; xi+11n i)
=
n 1X
i=1
Ki (xi; xi+1) ; (7)
where the function Ki is dened such that
Ki (x; y) = J (x1i; y1n i) : (8)
Also note that, for any x; y 2 D such that y > x and 1  k  n   1 Axiom
2 and Proposition 1 together imply
J (x1k; y1n k) > J (x1k; x1n k) = 0 (9)
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Equations (7)-(9) are su¢ cient to show that Ki (x; y) > 0 if y > x.
Part 1 of Proposition 2 shows that J satises a minimal inequality property;
part 2 demonstrates that Axioms 1 and 2 are su¢ cient to induce an appealing
decomposability property.
Proposition 3 For D = R the inequality measure J satises axioms 1 to 42 if
and only if there exist weights 1; :::; n 1 2 R++ such that, for all x 2 X (D):
J (x) =
n 1X
i=1
i [xi+1   xi] (10)
Proof. The ifpart is immediate.
From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that J must have the form (7).
Using Axiom 3 for the distribution (x1i; y1n i) we have
Ki (x; y) = J (x1i; y1n i)
= J (01i; [y   x]1n i)
= Ki (0; y   x) : (11)
Putting x = 0 in equation (11) and using axiom 4 it is clear that
Ki (0; y) = J (01i; y1n i)
= yJ (01i;1n i)
= iy; (12)
where i := Ki (0; 1). Applying axiom 2 to equation (7) we have i > 0.
Let us note that, by rearrangement, of (10) we have the convenient form
J (x) = n 1xn +
n 1X
i=2
[i 1   i]xi   1x1 (13)
This weighted-additive structure is useful for clarifying the distributive proper-
ties of the index J .
3.2 Properties of the J-class
To give shape to the class of measures found in Proposition 3 we need to
introduce some extra distributive principles. The following axiom may be stated
in weak or strict form for each position k where 1  k  n  1:
Axiom 5 (Position-k Monotonicity) For all x 2 X (D) such that xk < xk+1
inequality J (x) is decreasing or constant in xk.
2 If n = 2 then Axiom 1 is not required.
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However, the progressive-transfers axiom requires a slightly tighter choice of
k:
Axiom 6 (Progressive transfers) For any k such that 1 < k < n and any
x 2 X (D) such that xk < xk+1, a progressive transfer at position k implies
J (x(k; ))  J (x) : (14)
These two axioms have some interesting implications for the structure of the
inequality measure J . However their properties are independent and in each
case there is an argument for considering the axiom in strong or a weak form.
In the light of this there are a number of special cases that may appear to be
ethically attractive, including the following:
 Strong position-k monotonicity only inequality is strictly decreasing in
xk for all positions k.
 Strong progressive transfers the <part in (14) is true for all positions
k.
 Indi¤erence across positions inequality is constant in xk for all positions
k in the statement of Axiom 5. Indi¤erence clearly implies that the =
part in (14) is true.
Imposition of one or other form of Axioms 5 and 6 will have implications
for the structure of the positional weights fkg. First, it is clear from (13) that
Axiom 5 implies
0 < 1  :::  k  k+1  :::  n 1: (15)
since we have 1 > 0 in view of Proposition 3. So, increasing the poorest
persons income always reduces J-inequality. Second if we adopt the position of
indi¤erence across positions in Axiom 5 then
0 < 1 = ::: = k = k+1 = ::: = n 1:
In this case it is clear from (13) that the inequality measure becomes just a
multiple of the range.3 Third, an important property follows directly from
Axiom 6 alone:
Proposition 4 Given the conditions of proposition 3, imposition of the princi-
ple of progressive transfers at each position k, k = 2; :::; n   1 implies that the
weights k in (10) can be written
k = ' (k)
where ' is a concave function.
3We have to say a multiple ofbecause we have not introduced a normalisation axiom to
x, say, 1 = 1.
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Proof. Applying Axiom 6 to equation (13) we get
J (x)  J (x(k; )) = [k 1   k]    [k   k+1]   0
Given that  > 0 this implies
k  k 1 + k+1
2
which establishes concavity.
4 Relative measures
The discussion in section 3 is essentially absolutistin nature the translata-
bility property (Axiom 3) ensures this. Here we look at the possibility of a
relativistapproach to characterising an envy-regarding index.
4.1 Characterisation
In this case we have to deal with a restricted domain: D can consist only of
positive numbers (D = R++) and we impose the following axioms:
Axiom 7 (Zero Homogeneity) For all x 2 X (R++) and  2 R++:
J (x) = J (x)
Axiom 8 (Transformation) For all x 2 X (R++) and " 2 R++:
J (x") = "J (x)
where
x" := (x"1; x
"
2; :::; x
"
n)
Axioms 7 and 8 replace axioms 3 and 4 now that the denition of D is changed
from R to R++. This enables us to introduce a modied characterisation result:
Proposition 5 For D = R++ the inequality measure J satises axioms 1, 2,
7 and 8 if and only if there exist weights 1; :::; n 1 2 R++ such that, for all
x 2 X (D):
J (x) =
n 1X
i=1
i [lnxi+1   lnxi] (16)
Proof. For any y 2 X (R) let
x := (ey1 ; ey2 ; :::; eyn) (17)
and consider a function J^ dened as
J^ (y) := J (x)
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with x given by (17). Clearly J^ satises decomposition and monotonicity (ax-
ioms 1 and 2). Also, given (17), for any  2 R++ we have
x =
 
ey1 ; ey2 ; :::; eyn

(18)
and so
J^ (y) = J
 
x

= J (x)
by axiom 8; hence J^ (y) = J^ (y). Furthermore, given (17), for any " 2 R we
have
e"x =
 
ey1+"; ey2+"; :::; eyn+"

(19)
and so
J^ (y + "1n) = J (e
"x) = J (x)
by axiom 7; hence J^ (y + "1n) = J^ (y). Therefore if J satises axioms 1, 2, 7
and 8 then J^ satises axioms 1 to 4 on X (D) for D = R. Using proposition 3
we have therefore
J^ (y) =
n 1X
i=1
i [yi+1   yi] (20)
with 1; :::; n 1 2 R++. Using the transformation (17) in equation (20) gives
the result.
4.2 Properties
The properties of J are similar to those established in section 3.2. Clearly
J (x) = n 1 lnxn +
n 1X
i=2
[i 1   i] lnxi   1 lnx1 (21)
and position-k monotonicity (Axiom 5) again implies condition (15) and the
corollaries of this condition still apply. The counterpart of Proposition 4 is as
follows.
Proposition 6 Given the conditions of proposition 5, imposition of the princi-
ple of progressive transfers at each position k, k = 2; :::; n   1 implies that the
weights k in (16) can be written
k = ' (k)
where ' is a concave function.
Proof. If we have a progressive transfer at position k then, from equation (21)
the reduction in inequality is given by
J (x)  J (x(k; )) = [k   k+1] lnxk+1 + [k 1   k] lnxk
  [k   k+1] ln (xk+1   )  [k 1   k] ln (xk + )
= [k+1   k] ln

1  
xk+1

+ [k   k 1] ln

1 +

xk

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Expanding the last line of this expression we get
[k+1   k]
"
  
xk+1
  1
2


xk+1
2
  :::
#
+ [k   k 1]
"

xk
  1
2


xk
2
+ :::
#
which, neglecting second order and higher terms for small , gives
J (x)  J (x(k; )) ' [k   k 1] 
xk
  [k+1   k] 
xk+1
(22)
Applying Axiom 6 expression (22) must be non-negative which, given that  > 0,
implies
k [xk+1 + xk]  k 1xk+1 + k+1xk (23)
Dening
 :=
xk+1
xk+1 + xk
;
condition (23) becomes
k  k 1 + [1  ]k+1
where 12   < 1, which is su¢ cient to establish concavity.
5 Discussion
As we noted in the introduction, an important application of the relative indices
developed here is the formalisation of Mertons index, which is based on a sum
of justice evaluations.An individuals justice evaluation is given by
ln

A
C

(24)
where A is the actual amount reward and C is the just reward see also Jasso
(2000), page 338. Since we are concerned with inequality (and its counterpart
distributive injustice) it makes sense to consider the inverse of AC . If the just
reward for individual i is an immediately upward-looking concept then A = xi
and C = xi+1 and we should focus on
ln

C
A

= lnxi+1   lnxi; (25)
which is exactly the form that we have in (16).
Finally note that the indices derived here, although based on a set of ax-
ioms that might appear similar to those used in conventional inequality analy-
sis are fundamentally di¤erent from those associated with conventional non-
overlapping decomposable inequality indices (Ebert 1988). Instead the measures
(10) and (16) capture a type of keeping-up-with-the-Jonesesform of envy.
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